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held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 22 June 1989, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Alfonso García Robles (Mexico)

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The PRESIDENT: The 511th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is called to order.

First of all, I should like to extend a warm welcome, on behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf, to the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, who will be following our work today. In so doing I should like to thank him for his efficient and active co-operation with this single multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, and his willingness to support the additional requirements arising from Conference activities.

Today the Conference continues its consideration of agenda items 1 and 2, entitled "Nuclear test ban" and "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". On the list of speakers for today I have the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Sri Lanka. I now call on the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. Batsanov.

Mr. BATSANOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): First of all, Mr. President, I should like to welcome you as the President of our Conference. The Soviet delegation is particularly pleased to see in this important post the representative of the friendly State of Mexico, an outstanding diplomat and a Nobel Peace Prize winner. Allow me also to express our gratitude to the representative of Kenya, Ambassador Bullut, who chaired the Conference during the last month of its spring 1989 session.

In the period since the completion of the spring session of the Conference on Disarmament a series of important developments have taken place which have the most direct bearing on the problems under consideration here. I think you will understand me if at the outset I say a few words about an event of crucial significance primarily but not exclusively for my country, the Congress of People's Deputies. The Congress was both a result of the process of perestroika, which began four years ago, and a fundamentally new stage in its development. It is leading us to new frontiers of democracy and glasnost, and the implementation of the principle of pluralism of opinions. These were 12 days which shook a great deal in the minds of Soviet people and their perception of themselves and their country. The results of the Congress bear witness to a shift from the long years of despotic rule of an administrative and command system to a normal, politically open life. Of course, serious tests await us, and this was reconfirmed by the Congress. There are problems connected with shortcomings in political education, the inadequacy of protective machinery in the functioning of democracy. The Congress has provided the whole of Soviet society with an exceptionally broad range of lessons and rich food for thought and for future work in developing the process of perestroika.

We consider perestroika as part of the growing democratization of the whole world order, and as the Soviet Union's contribution to the solution of the global problems facing mankind. And it is no accident that the Congress of People's Deputies has adopted a message to the peoples of the world which maps out the political strategy of the Soviet State and sets out the principles governing its foreign policy in accordance with the new political thinking. These principles include in particular a provision to the effect

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

that the security of a country should be guaranteed first of all by political means, as a component of overall and equal security in the process of demilitarization, democratization and humanization of international relations, the need to eliminate nuclear weapons through negotiations oriented towards disarmament and the reduction of the defence potential of States to levels of reasonable sufficiency, and the inadmissibility of the use of force or the threat of force. These principles will also underpin Soviet policy in the field of disarmament, which is based on the fact that the nature of current weaponry does not give a single State grounds to hope that it can defend itself solely using military technology, and that consequently the arms race is as fruitless as it is absurd.

The continuation of this race on Earth, and a fortiori its extension into outer space, can serve only to step up the already critically high rate of accumulation and sophistication of weapons, particularly nuclear weapons. Today's realities show that not just nuclear war itself, or any other war, but even preparations for such a war - in other words the arms race and the desire to achieve military superiority - cannot objectively bring any political or any other gain to anyone. The underpinning and in a way the guarantee of our policy in the field of disarmament is the new Soviet military doctrine, which has an unequivocally defensive orientation. The content of this doctrine, like the specific tasks of the armed forces of the USSR and the nature of military development, tactical and strategic plans and policy concerning weapons and equipment - in a word, all our decisions and actions in the field of national defence - are determined by the obligations of the USSR not to initiate military action against any other State unless we ourselves are the subject of aggression, and never, under any circumstances, to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

The structural reorganization of the armed forces of the USSR currently taking place is directing the fundamental orientation of our military doctrine towards imparting a strictly defensive character to those forces and towards their future evolution on the basis of reasonable defensive sufficiency. In practical terms we consider that this principle of defensive sufficiency involves giving the armed forces of the USSR a non-offensive structure, placing a ceiling on the proportion of attack components in those forces, making changes in their deployment with a view to fulfilling strictly defensive tasks, lowering the parameters governing mobilization of the armed forces and reducing the volume of military production. In keeping with the new Soviet military doctrine we are reviewing many of our programmes of military technology and reducing our plans for the development of weapons and equipment. We are now discontinuing a number of projects involving the use of strike and offensive weapons systems.

Distinguished delegates are of course aware of the plans for unilateral reductions by the Soviet Union in its armed forces and armaments, including those on the territory of our allies. These plans are now at the implementation stage. Thus by 15 August of this year, out of the groups of Soviet troops deployed in the allied States parties to the Warsaw Treaty, 3 tank divisions will be withdrawn (2 from the German Democratic Republic and 1 from Hungary), 24 tactical missile launchers, about 2,700 tanks and a significant quantity of other weapons. Between May and August this year one tank division and several other units, including air force units, will be withdrawn from Mongolia.

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

The reduction in Soviet defence expenditure in the next two years will result in total savings of nearly 30 billion roubles, and by 1995 we intend to reduce the share of defence expenditure in national income by a third to a half. The accelerated conversion of military production and the release of resources and capacities in order to tackle social and economic goals will take place concurrently. By 1995 the share of civilian goods in the total output of defence industries will reach 60 per cent. This process will go hand in hand with the development of truly democratic, open procedures for the consideration and adoption of military budgets by the USSR Supreme Soviet, including the provision of comprehensive information on actual defence expenditure to the members of the Soviet, thus enabling them to play an active part in the consideration and allocation of military expenditure. At the Congress of People's Deputies the total amount of 77.3 billion roubles for our country's expenditure on defence was made public, together with a breakdown by specific items.

We cannot fail to derive satisfaction from the continuing positive trends in the development of international relations which many speakers before me have referred to here. These trends emerged once again during the May visit to Moscow by United States Secretary of State, James Baker, which we regard as a good beginning to a major undertaking, a serious and substantial dialogue. During the visit, agreement was reached in particular to set in motion once again the Soviet-American machinery for negotiations and consultations on a wide range of arms limitation and disarmament problems, including nuclear and space weapons, the prohibition of chemical weapons, and the limitation and cessation of nuclear tests. This is important because in disarmament matters the pace of negotiations is extremely significant, since the forces of inertia and the constraints are considerable. This is why we would like to end the pause in the negotiating process as soon as possible and begin intensive discussion of outstanding issues.

The agreements reached in May are aleady being implemented. The second week of the bilateral Soviet-American discussions on chemical weapons is now drawing to an end. The bilateral negotiations on nuclear tests will be resumed on 26 June. A new round of nuclear and space arms talks has recently opened here in Geneva. The Soviet Union believes that the process of nuclear disarmament which began with the signature of the INF treaty should become irreversible. The next stage in this process is the completion of the Soviet-American negotiations on a 50 per cent reduction in their strategic offensive arms while observing the ABM Treaty. The basis for this already exists, and the still outstanding issues in our view are not insurmountable provided that both sides make appropriate efforts.

Further evidence that the Soviet-American dialogue on security matters is being further developed is to be found in the agreement between the Governments of the two countries on the prevention of dangerous military activities which was signed on 12 June in Moscow. Its main purpose was to set up reliable treaty-based machinery to prevent inadvertant and unintentional incidents between their armed forces from growing into military conflict. During the United States Secretary of State's visit to Moscow Mr. Baker had an extremely important meeting with M.S. Gorbachev, at which the Soviet side put forward major proposals aimed at ensuring success at the Vienna negotiations on the reduction of conventional armed forces in Europe, as well as important

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

initiatives on the unilateral reduction of Soviet tactical nuclear weapons in Europe and a proposal for a comprehensive solution of this issue. We believe that the goal of eliminating tactical nuclear weapons requires dialogue and negotiations, which, together with measures to reduce conventional arms, would lead to the restructuring of armed forces both in the West and in the East on a defensive basis.

We note with satisfaction that for the first time our proposals advanced during the visit of the United States Secretary of State to Moscow were met not with immediate suspicion and criticism but with a serious and concrete response. I have in mind the recent proposals by United States President G. Bush contained in the final documents of the summit meeting of the NATO Council in Brussels. The United States and NATO have agreed to reduce their manpower in Europe. It is encouraging that the NATO side has shown readiness to extend arms reductions to its own offensive systems, instead of requiring us alone to take such measures. On the whole range of numerical parameters - related to tanks, armoured vehicles, artillery and combat helicopers - our positions are now close or coincide. An agreement can therefore be achieved at the Vienna negotiations much earlier than previously planned. We also appreciate the acceptance of part of the Soviet proposal on the negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons, although we have misgivings about the conditions attached.

In general the spirit of the times is noticeable in the NATO documents, although both the text and the subtext still contain many concepts inherited from the period of confrontation, including those serving ideologically motivated didactic purposes. From time to time they crop up in the discussions at our Conference. The understandings reached between the USSR and the Federal Republic of Germany during M.S. Gorbachev's visit to that country are of fundamental and long-term significance. We believe that they have imparted new dynamism to the process of East/West co-operation, overcoming the legacy of the "cold war". The joint statement on the results of the visit not only sets out basic approaches to the creation of a Europe of peace and co-operation and the further development of bilateral relations, but in fact puts forward a programme of concrete action in the area of arms limitation and disarmament, including the prohibition of chemical weapons, the cessation of nuclear tests, confidence-building, the development of transparency and the prevention of crises. The foreign ministers agreed on a special statement on the prohibition of chemical weapons aimed at the speedy implementation of the decisions of the Paris Conference.

Of course, everything in the world is interrelated. We will not achieve genuine and radical disarmament without simultaneously changing the political climate on our planet in a drastic way. This includes raising the level of confidence and co-operation, solving the ecological problem and other global problems, changing North-South relations and guaranteeing human rights and the rights of entire nations. But on the other hand, progress in all these areas is hardly possible without disarmament. Likewise, the disarmament process cannot be limited to measures taken in a bilateral or regional framework, however important they might be. Hence the Conference on Disarmament has an irreplaceable role to play in this process. This is also true of the "nuclear items" on the agenda of the Conference. The task of blocking all avenues by which new types and systems of nuclear weapons may be developed and spread

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

around the world is of growing significance in the context of an incipient process of real disarmament. The cessation and prohibition of nuclear tests is one of the most effective ways of accomplishing that task.

The Soviet Union consistently advocates the most radical solution to the problem of nuclear tests. Yes, we are a nuclear Power, yet we believe that the cessation of tests is in the interets of universal stability and security, and consequently in our own interests. We stand ready at any time to introduce a moratorium on nuclear explosions together with the United States. However, given the fact that at present the United States is not yet ready for a radical solution to this problem, we have chosen to advance towards that goal step by step. At the Soviet-American negotiations on that issue which resume on 26 June we shall seek to finalize measures for verifying the 1974 and 1976 treaties as soon as possible in order to proceed immediately to the next stage of drawing up agreements on further limitation of the yield and number of tests, with a view to their eventual cessation. However, bilateral negotiations cannot be regarded as a substitute for multilateral efforts and the solution to this problem at the Conference on Disarmament. Setting up a working body of the Conference on this subject, where practical consideration of a nuclear test ban could be initiated, is not only overdue but long overdue. During the spring session of the Conference, through the efforts of many delegations, and above all those of the distinguished Ambassador of Japan, C. Yamada, we succeeded in laying a sound basis for reaching agreement. In our view the final solution to this issue should figure prominently on the work of the Conference at this summer session.

The Soviet Union views all initiatives aimed at ending nuclear tests with sympathy and support. We subscribe to the idea of extending the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty to underground tests as well; we are ready to implement our obligations as a depositary of the Treaty fully in convening the proposed conference to consider the amendments, and we will co-operate actively to that end both with the other depositaries and with the States which put forward the proposal or have supported it. In so doing, without ignoring fundamental differences in approaches by States to the problem of nuclear tests in general and amendments to the Treaty in particular, we intend to work for a constructive conference and urge all other interested parties to act likewise.

Another important means of limiting the modernization of nuclear weapons and curbing the quantitative and qualitative arms race could, we believe, be the termination of production of fissionable materials for nuclear warheads. As M.S. Gorbachev stated during his visit to Britain, the Soviet Union has decided to cease production of highly enriched uranium for military purposes this year. In addition to the shut-down of the industrial reactor for the production of weapons-grad plutonium in 1987, we plan to close two other such reactors this year and next year without commissioning new units to replace them. The above-mentioned measures undertaken by the Soviet Government are of course only a first step. The USSR supports the conclusion of a special international agreement on the cessation and eventual complete prohibition of the production of fissionable materials for nuclear weapons. Our call to conclude such an agreement is for understandable reasons addressed primarily to the United States Administration. It is also legitimate to raise the question of the non-use of nuclear warheads from the weapons systems which are to be eliminated in other weapons systems, which was touched upon in

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

particular in the statement made on 13 June by the distinguished representative of Sweden, M.-B. Theorin. We believe that in the context of a verifiable agreement on cessation of the production of fissionable materials for use in weapons, the elaboration of which we are proposing to the United States, the problem of the destruction of nuclear warheads which become available as a result of the dismantling of weapons could also be discussed.

Unfortunately, virtually every time that the issue of nuclear disarmament measure comes up, whether in the form of a test ban or the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons, we hear references to the sacred cow of nuclear deterrence. The discussions at the Conference on Disarmament are no exception to this. We believe that if we are to speak of deterrence, we should speak not of deterrence by means of nuclear weapons but rather of deterrence of nuclear weapons themselves. This means abandoning the stockpiling and upgrading of such weapons, the steady and unswerving elimination of stocks until they have been completely eliminated, and prohibition of production. However, we are realists and we believe that given the very threatening nature of the concept of nuclear deterrence and its inconsistency with universal principles of morality, the movement towards renunciation of this concept should be gradual, taking into account the security interests of all States, including those that currently pin their defence on the nuclear factor. In this respect an important role is to be played by the establishment of truly defensive military structures in the States concerned, and confidence-building in the military field. The final result of this process should be the elaboration on the basis of a broad international consensus of a really feasible alternative to nuclear deterrence. True, the path to a nuclear-free world is strewn with many difficulties. Certain intermediate stages will be needed. Yet we believe in the real attainability of this goal, and we intend to pursue it not only through growing transparency and reliable verficiation, but also through confidence-building, which depends upon many aspects of present-day international life. However, the reduction and elimination of the nuclear threat is impossible unless a solution is found to the problem of preventing an arms race in space, which brings me to item 5 of the Conference's agenda.

As M.S. Gorbachev stressed in his recent message to the leaders of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Tanzania and Sweden on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the Six-nation Initiative, space should remain free of arms. The Soviet-American dialogue in this field is important but, to quote the message, "more active use of multilateral diplomacy, and primarily the Conference on Disarmament", is also needed. The Soviet leader also confirmed in this context that the USSR "has not placed arms in space on a permanent basis and has no intention of being the first to do so". We have been and continue to be advocates of workable, far-reaching measures for the prevention of an arms race in space. They include, for instance, the prohibition of anti-satellite systems and space-to-Earth weapons, the creation of a system for the verification of the non-placement of arms in outer space, and in particular the establishment of an international space inspectorate, as well as a number of other proposals. We also believe that now it is important to try to find a common basis which would allow the Committee to move from general debate to the search for concrete arrangements. This might be a small first step to begin with, but it should and can be taken. Why should we not begin with measures to strengthen confidence and openness, which have proved

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

themselves in some other field of arms limitation? As far as the Soviet delegation is concerned, it would not object to taking as a basis the idea proposed by the Federal Republic of Germany of "rules of the road" in space, including the elaboration of fly-by rules for manned and unmanned spacecraft, advance notification of the launch of space objects, inspections, the exchange of information, and so on. Also deserving of attention in this context is the French idea of space-based remote sensing systems for providing the international community with information, particularly in such areas as verification of arms limitation and the reduction of international tension. For our part, we too are working on specific considerations related to the issues of space monitoring.

Like the delegations of many other States, the Soviet delegation sincerely hopes that during the summer session of the Conference on Disarmament we will succeed in translating the results of the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons into real progress at the negotiations within the framework of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, making it possible to prepare a convention on the subject for signature at the earliest date. The efforts of the representative of France, Ambassador Morel, to attain that goal deserve the highest appreciation. We trust that with active and constructive participation by all member States of the Conference on Disarmament and observers in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons we shall be able shortly to reach agreement on a general system of verification of compliance with the future convention, resolve outstanding issues relating to the régime of authorized synthesis and production of schedule [1] chemicals, and move forward in resolving the issues of economic co-operation and development (article XI) and assistance in the event of the use of chemical weapons (article X). As for verification of compliance with the convention, in our view it should be based on a combination of systematic international verification and challenge inspections of any site or facility without the right of refusal. On this understanding we will not object to the proposal made by a number of States that no specific mention of the activities of national technical means of verification should be made in the convention.

A number of interesting considerations designed to improve the system of verification have recently been set out at the Conference on Disarmament. In particular, in April this year the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic, Oskar Fischer, advanced the idea of testing challenge inspection procedures. We are also studying with interest the working paper introduced by the delegation by the United Kingdom containing the first results of such trial inspections carried out in that country. For my part I wish to inform you that the USSR is also carrying out a national experiment related to challenge inspections, within the framework of which one visit to a military storage facility has already taken place. A summary of the results of this experiment will be presented at the negotiations.

Since the Soviet delegation intends to make a separate statement on the problems involved in the prohibition of chemical weapons, I shall refrain from a more detailed presentation of our views on this issue now, and limit myself to just one additional remark. Like all other delegations of member States of the Conference on Disarmament, we welcome the active interest in the talks on the prohibition of chemical weapons on the part of a great number of countries, and note with satisfaction that the number of countries now

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

participating in the negotiations is no longer 40 but 64. This is a very positive development that paves the way to ensuring the universality of the future convention, which in turn is important both from a global point of view and from the standpoint of strengthening security and stability in various regions. In this connection the Soviet delegation attaches great significance to the provision of the Final Declaration of the Paris Conference which states that any State wishing to contribute to the negotiations on chemical weapons should be able to do so. Let us be mindful of the agreement reached by all of us in Paris.

In conclusion, let me say a few words on a more personal note. First of all I would like to thank wholeheartedly all the distinguished representatives who have welcomed me as the new head of the USSR delegation to the Conference on Disarmament. Although I have participated in the work of the Conference since 1979, I am aware that I still have much to learn, and I am sincerely looking forward to good will and co-operation on the part of the distinguished representatives. I would like to assure you all that the Soviet delegation has been, is and will be open to business-like co-operation with the delegations of member States of the Conference as well as States participating in its work as observers. I would like to avail myself of this opportunity to convey Ambassador Nazarkin's gratitude to all the representatives who wished him success in his new assignment. Finally, I join all those who have bid farewell to our outgoing colleagues - the representative of Argentina, Ambassador Campora, the representative of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Rodrigo the representative of Italy, Ambassador Pugliese. The Soviet delegation wishes them and their families bon voyage, good health and every success.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the distinguished representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the statement he has just made, and particularly for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now call on the distinguished representative of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Nihal Rodrigo.

Mr. RODRIGO (Sri Lanka): Mr. President, it is a very special privilege to address the CD under your eminent guidance. Your towering contribution to the cause of peace and disarmament is too well known to want description by me. Your work and your sense of dedication has been an inspiration to me since our very first association during the preparatory work of the non-aligned group in the period before the first SSOD. Our thanks are also due to Ambassador Bullut for his efficient stewardship of the Conference last month. It is my pleasure to see and welcome Under-Secretary-General Akashi with us this morning. I would also like to take this opportunity to congratulate Ambassador Batsanov on his appointment as the head of the USSR delegation, and to wish him well. What was his maiden speech as Soviet representative is now followed by my farewell speech.

Virtually all speakers in the plenary have been commenting on the generally propitious climate now in evidence for the enhancement of international security and the promotion of disarmament measures. The two major nuclear-weapon States have, through careful internal and other decision-making processes, resolved to pursue their security and other interests through radically different and new approaches. In the last year alone, since the ratification of the INF agreement, we have seen further steps

(Mr. Rodrigo, Sri Lanka)

towards negotiations on the reduction of the strategic offensive weapons of the two major nuclear Powers. In Vienna, negotiations on confidence-building measures and on the reduction of conventional armed forces in Europe have been advanced through new proposals, and political will has been developed to expedite their outcome. Unilateral disarmament initiatives and force reductions should find a corresponding response. In Geneva, bilateral nuclear and space talks have resumed this week.

All this has set in motion a de-escalation of tensions between the two nuclear Powers and the alliances in which they have placed their trust. Beyond disarmament, which is in a sense an aspect of international security, we also see several healthy tendencies, however tentative, tendencies whereby security is being considered not merely as a matter of regulating relations between States and their arsenals, but also as a matter necessitating the rational management, preservation and development of our single environment. Technology exchanges, communication linkages, economic interdependance and promotion of global markets, the development of new centres of economic power and the blurring of national boundaries have all combined to compel approaches to security which take into account not merely the national interest of a few States but also the need to accommodate the concerns of the totality of mankind. The pace of disarmament, which has its own unique dynamic and its own special momentum, will undoubtedly be helped on in the context of these wider global concepts and concerns.

The impact of these developments has certainly been appreciated in the CD, as many of the statements in plenary have indicated. Nevertheless, in most areas of work in the Conference, despite its accepted position as the single multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, a corresponding will to negotiate has not been built up. In Sri Lanka's last statement, comment was made on the lack of tangible progress in respect of negotiating a comprehensive nuclear test ban, and on initiatives consequently being taken outside the Conference that might help to spur the CD's own efforts. Similarly we expressed the hope that following the Paris Conference of January this year, which underlined in universal political terms the urgency of the CD's tasks in respect of chemical weapons, the requisite political determination would be manifested to expedite a comprehensive and effective ban on these weapons. We have been kept briefed about the proposed Canberra conference. While we acknowledge the important need to "prepare" the chemical industry for the effective implementation of the convention being negotiated here in Geneva, the Canberra conference should not give credence to any possible partial or interim measures which could detract from the Geneva negotiations or lead to industry restraints on the transfer of technology.

While the universal consensus against chemical weapons has engendered a sense of urgency in the CD, regrettably the declared determination of all to prevent an arms race in outer space does not appear to be reflected in the record of the CD on this vital subject. In the CD, since 1985 the Ad hoc Committee concerned has dealt with the complexities of the subject and examined the existing legal régime - its positive elements as well as its limitations. The Committee has also had elucidated before it a number of proposals directed at different aspects of the overall question of preserving outer space for peaceful purposes and negotiating an agreement or agreements to prevent an arms race in outer space. All this has brought to light a

(Mr. Rodrigo, Sri Lanka)

complex of legal, political, technical and other issues which need to be engaged in a serious manner. The working paper (CD/905) presented by Ambassador Bayart of Mongolia, Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, provides an admirable summary of the proposals and initiatives advanced by different member States underr item 5. The time has perhaps now come for a structured, more organized, negotiations-oriented approach to all the issues of outer space.

Document CD/905 is a convenient reminder also that there is clearly an intrinsic link between the three items on the Ad hoc Committee's work programme in the context of which the individual proposals can be given more detailed and organized examination. This would facilitate their clarification as well as the eventual negotiation of those proposals which have endured the weight of critical scrutiny and gained general acceptance. Unfortunately the Committee appears to be frittering away valuable time each successive year on sterile organizational debate on the hierachy and relative importance of the items on the work programme.

It is clear that despite differences of view among members, the major role played by the existing legal régime in outer space has been acknowledged. The future enhancement of this régime through wider participation and more complete compliance with existing treaties is a need universally acknowledged. The extent of its efficacy in preventing an arms race in outer space is of course an open question. The argument that it has held the peace thus far is hardly a guarantee for the future, given the bewildering pace of technological developments and the fact that what we call the space age is barely three decades old.

In Geneva, bilateral talks between the Soviet Union and the United States have resumed this week on space issues, and any reluctance to be engaged in negotiations in a multilateral forum like the CD may perhaps be explained in terms of a lack of finality in negotiating positions. Nevertheless the commencement in parallel, in the CD, of negotiations on space issues will not deny the special responsibility of those with major space capabilities nor in any way hinder or circumscribe their efforts towards commonly held goals.

There could be two basic approaches to negotiations on outer space in the CD. The first could focus on disarmament and arms control, and would involve working towards a comprehensive ban or limitations on weapons of all types. This would also involve the consideration of proposals for the amendment of the 1967 outer space Treaty. This approach would furthermore need to work towards guaranteeing immunity for satellites and the banning or severe restriction of ASAT weapons. The second alternative approach would concentrate for the time being on confidence-building measures, and here there is an abundance of material on which to work profitably and productively. This includes the French proposal on an international satellite monitoring agency, the Soviet proposal on an international space inspectorate, the proposals made by the Federal Republic of Germany on "rules of the road", and proposals advanced by a number of delegations, including my own, which centre on the strengthening of the registration Convention and measures for greater transparency in outer space activities.

(Mr. Rodrigo, Sri Lanka)

Helsinki, Stockholm and Vienna have all shown the advantages of the second sort of approach in ultimately helping the first sort. Neither Helsinki nor Stockholm focused on disarmament per se, but they nevertheless provided a helpful climate which eased the way for disarmament and arms control in the European context. The suggestion that consideration should be given to a protocol to the registration Convention deserves particular consideration. This could be a concrete first step, modest though it may seem, towards the realization of one of the goals of the 1967 outer space Treaty by building international confidence in space activities through greater openness.

With respect to outer space, preventing an arms race is decidedly better than curing or curbing one. The choice could still be exercised between, on the one hand, pursuing its potential for peaceful development, and, on the other, courting conflicts of a nature and scale that could hardly be assessed at this early stage of man's entry into space.

The spreading launch capability of militarily significant States is being justified on both civilian and defence grounds. Space applications and the conversion of currently Earth-bound or modest technological capabilities are no longer a remote possibility. If the current space Powers do not support a multilateral process for preventing the weaponization of space, the entire existing space system, which is said to provide strategic stability, could, with the inevitable proliferation of military space tecnology, become a soft strategic target. Experience shows that sectoral controls without a comprehensive and multilateral approach, as for example in the nuclear and chemical field, cannot ensure globally effective non-proliferation.

Quite apart from likely future applications in space, the refining of launch capabilities could hardly be expected to promote confidence in regions which have thus far been spared the dubious advantage of such weaponry. If the potential for more sophisticated space application appears remote at this point of time, then at least the regional ramifications of such capabilities deserve consideration.

This is my last intervention in the CD as the representative of Sri Lanka. Some farewell statements have tended to pronounce judgements on the CD, its methods of work or methods of inactivity, and to make prescriptions for greater effectiveness. With barely two years in the CD I hardly feel qualified to engage in such an exercise.

For a small country like Sri Lanka, membership in the CD has been more than a nominal privilege. Being a militarily insignificant State with a small delegation at the Conference table has not, however, made us feel any less inadequate in a forum which includes among its membership virtually all the major military Powers - global as well as regional. Indeed, Sri Lanka has felt it a special honour to represent as we do not merely ourselves but, in a sense, also the vast majority of non-aligned States whose security and strength is based not on weapons, and whose reliance and trust in the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, international law and non-alignment constitute an important line of defence in protecting our independence and sovereignity.

(Mr. Rodrigo, Sri Lanka)

All States big and small are equal in the face of the omnipresent threat of nuclear weapons. This threat also unites us all. The CD is a representative organ, and its credibility would be enhanced to the extent that it is able to take account of the concerns of all States, including the small States. This is particularly critical at a time of great power shifts and tectonic movements which could lock small States into situations not of their choosing, or even crush them.

The CD's basic agenda has remained the same since the late 1970s. The emphasis, as it rightly should be, has been on global disarmament issues. In Vienna, a new focus has been concentrated on conventional weapons in a particular regional context, in this case that of Europe. Admittedly, Europe is a special case. Twice in a mere half-century the cancer of war has spread world-wide from conflicts emanating from this single region. The legacy of the last war is indeed still being unravelled.

To concentrate such a focus in a regional framework on conventional weapons has not in any way downgraded the overriding priority of dealing with th nuclear threat. Speakers before me have commented on the settlement or near-settlement in terms of the current healthier relationship between the super-Powers, of issues described as "regional" and in which it has been conventional weapons that have had their play. I would not of course agree with some speakers that the persistence of some such regional problems obstructs the future improvement of relations between the major Powers. The situation is far more complex, and generalizations mask the true position. Many though not all of the regional issues that have been discussed were in fact complicated and exacerbated, if not indeed caused, by some super-Power action. The solution of these issues, by the same token, has been facilitated by the development of more enlightened attitudes on the part of the super-Powers, based on principles advocated by the United Nations and by the non-aligned group.

In different circumstances other regional situations could also become centres of conflict, not necessarily in consequence of extra-regional factors. Suggestions that regional aspects of disarmament and conventional disarmament require some formalized framework for consideration in the CD deserve careful attention. The issues involved do not lend themselves to easy analysis.

In my first intervention before the CD in August 1987, I stated that I was beginning work where my predecessor left off. From where I leave off now, my successor will continue reiterating the consistent commitment of Sri Lanka to the important work of the CD as the single multilateral negotiating forum in the field of disarmament. For me personally the last two years in the CD have been a richly rewarding experience, and I am grateful for the insights they have afforded me on a multitude of issues concerning disarmament and international security. Let me in conclusion thank you all for your friendship and wish the CD all success in its vital task.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the distinguished representative of Sri Lanka for the kind words he addressed to the Chair at the beginning of his statement. I am sure that I speak on behalf of all the members of the Conference when I thank him for his activities here during the

(The President)

two years when he was part of the Conference. We learned with special pleasure that his Government holds a well-deserved opinion of his participation in the Conference on Disarmament, and that in his country's Foreign Ministry he is to head the United Nations bureau, while remaining closely connected with disarmament as a member of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters. He may be sure that in that task the best wishes of all his former colleagues in the Conference go with him.

I have no other speakers on my list for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? It seems not. Consequently, I should like to turn to the request from Qatar to participate in our work in the plenary and in the subsidiary bodies established under items 4, 7 and 8 of the agenda. The note from Qatar was circulated on 8 June, and no comments have been received from the members. That being the case, we may take a decision on the request without holding an informal meeting, on the understanding that this sets no precedent for the future.

I put before the Conference the draft decision contained in document CD/WP.366, concerning the request received from Qatar. If there is no objection, I shall consider it adopted.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I now turn to the timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. The timetable has been prepared after consultations with the chairmen of the ad hoc committees. As usual, the timetable is merely indicative and subject to change if necessary. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 27 June at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.10 a.m.